Finding a God-less Morality

FROM THE ARCHIVES (Columns)

Finding a God-less Morality

Jeremy Patrick (jhaeman@hotmail.com)

The Humanist, Sep.-Oct. 2002

"All great truths begin as blasphemies."

--George Bernard Shaw

When certain people become distraught by such things as a terrorist act, rising HIV rates, or an increase in teen pregnancy, they often proclaim that the problem is that we have drifted away from God. The idea, in its most basic form, is that a belief in God is essential to "morality." With a little work, one can find that both theologians and statesmen historically favored this view. Even many of the so-called founding fathers, largely deists, took this position. For example, in his farewell address as president, George Washington stated that "reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle."

The idea that a belief in God is essential to morality is a provocative one because it can erase the need for a dialogue on whether God actually exists. Advocates of this position can argue that whether or not he exists, people should believe in God for the benefit of society.

In its crassest form, this is purely a utilitarian appeal. Without morality, the argument goes, there will be no sanction against evil, and therefore, people will be unhappy because crime will run rampant. Of course, if the mechanism of religion's promotion of morality is through fear (of Hell) and reward (of Heaven), there is no reason a secular society cannot provide equally powerful inducements for "good" behavior. Although perhaps not as grandiose as eternal punishment, life in prison, death or torture are all powerful ways to induce desired behavior. Similarly, many people would gladly act for earthly wealth and power and could never be swayed by promises of a future paradise in the sky.

There are, however, more serious arguments from God to morality that merit our consideration. In his Herculean attempt to provide a purely rational morality that was categorically and universally binding on all people, Immanuel Kant argued that all actions should be taken in accordance with predetermined maxims and all people should be treated as ends, not as mere means. Although he believed we should not seek happiness for its own sake, he believed that by following the categorical imperatives, we would make ourselves worthy of happiness.

Ironically, although he believed that there were no rational reasons for believing in God, Kant argued that a belief in him was necessary for morality. He believed that a God must exist who rewards virtue in a future state, "for otherwise all the subjectively necessary duties which I am under obligation as a rational being to perform lose their objective reality. Why should I make myself worthy of happiness by means of moral conduct if there exists no Being who can secure me this happiness?"

The problem with Kant’s view is quite clear: he is treating a belief in God itself as a mere means to an end, thereby violating his most sacred principle. He is unconcerned with the truth of whether or not such a creature exists and is instead using the idea to further a consequentialist agenda. As Kantian scholar Theodore Green said, "God still remains, in Kant's argument, deus ex machina introduced to resolve our moral perplexities, the great Paymaster who is to reward us for our moral efforts. But surely, if on Kant's own principles, it is wrong to use men merely as means to our own ends; we are not entitled to bring God into our scheme of things primarily as a means to our ultimate happiness."

Finally, we come to the third and perhaps the most important use of the argument that God is essential to morality. This is the view taken by many modern theologians and holds that although a secular society can provide means to reach any end, it cannot choose which ends to seek without religious belief. This argument has some merit: after all, it follows Nietzsche's greatest insight: "Skepticism about morality is what is decisive. The ending of the moral interpretation of the world, which no longer has any sanction after it has tried to escape into some metaphysical beyond, leads to nihilism."

But while this proves that there is no rational way to prove that our ends are "correct" and our "morality" is binding on individuals, it does not prevent a society from coming to a consensus on what goals it wishes to seek.

So while we cannot prove that everyone should seek happiness, for example, we can understand that the vast majority of us do seek it and attempt to fashion a society that fosters it. Such a society might institute the maxims of utilitarianism. Similarly, we could decide that justice, understood as fairness, is the most important end we want to seek and institute a Rawlsian view of society.

In the end, we should not simply ask whether morality is possible without religion, but whether morality exists with religion. In their 1995 book The Bible Tells Me So: Uses and Abuses of Holy Scripture, Jim Hill and Rand Cheadle demonstrate how identifying oneself as "Christian" tells us little more than that one believes in the divinity of Christ. On every single pressing moral issue there have been Christians on both sides of the debate. Whether it's homosexuality, slavery, pacifism, capital punishment or abortion, if God is necessary for morality, we still don't know which side is correct.

Those who think that immorality is rampant today because of a lack of religion should heed the words of Bertrand Russell: "In the so-called ages of faith, when men really did believe the Christian religion in all its completeness, there was the Inquisition, with its tortures; there were [thousands] of unfortunate women burned as witches; and there was every kind of cruelty practiced upon all sorts of people in the name of religion."

Perhaps people who live in glass houses . . .

(c) Jeremy Patrick, 2002